Demenita

Incapacity not found even though dementia present:

Dr. Bowers, who attended Mrs. Merralls while she was confined in the hospital for treatment for the fractured hip, testified that in September, 1929, she was suffering from arteriosclerotic dementia, which had progressed to a degree, according to his opinion, which rendered her incompetent. He said this affliction was progressive in its character and usually slow in its progress, consisting of a hardening of the arteries ultimately resulting in failure to nourish the brain by means of adequate blood supply, and that mental deterioration gradually follows. Arteriosclerosis is usually recognized as an affliction of old age. It may be aggravated by disease or dissipation. It may be evidenced by general debility, atrophied muscles, poor circulation, low temperature, loss of appetite, impaired memory, rambling conversation, and mental and physical exhaustion. It is said that the true arteriosclerosis frequently causes neuralgia of the heart or angina pectoris, which is a common cause of death. It is apparent that the mere existence of arteriosclerosis does not render a person mentally incompetent. The effect of this disease upon the faculties of the mind depends upon its flagrancy and the degree to which it has [130 Cal.App. 682] progressed. Probably most old people suffer to some extent from hardening of the arteries. Many who suffer from angina pectoris or arteriosclerosis retain their mental faculties to the end of life. The question for solution in the present case is not whether the grantor was afflicted with arteriosclerosis, but rather, had that disease progressed to an extent that her mind had become so deteriorated she was incompetent to execute the deed of conveyance which is involved herein?

Doctor Bowers is the only expert witness who testified regarding her mental incompetency. Upon the contrary, Jessie Guilloz, who had been her intimate friend for twenty years, testified that Mrs. Merralls was competent to transact business. Mr. Dunkley, an agent for Marsh & Co., which firm loaned the money which was secured by a mortgage on the premises, visited her at the hospital in March after the execution of the deed, and conversed with her regarding the transaction in which his firm was interested. He said she was then "perfectly rational."

In view of the fact that Mrs. Merralls was a widow of considerable wealth and possessed of various properties; that for many years she had transacted all of her own business affairs; that a prominent financial institution had made loans of money to her upon real estate security without questioning her competency; that with the exception of Charles Merralls, the grantor's son, who said that he thought his mother was incompetent because "she was easily influenced in the transactions of real estate affairs," no acquaintance or individual, other than Doctor Bowers, testified to circumstances or conditions intimating that she was incompetent; that the execution of the deed was in strict accordance with the specific provisions of her former contract for conveyance, which was made by her four years previous thereto, and that the consideration for the property was apparently fair and adequate, we are unable to say there is not an abundance of evidence to support the findings and judgment to the effect that the grantor was competent and that the deed is valid and binding.

The burden of proving that a deed was procured by fraud, mistake, or undue influence ordinarily rests upon the party who challenges the validity of the instrument. 9 Cal. Jur. 231, § 108. When, in the absence of confidential [130 Cal.App. 683] relationship, a conveyance of property is made for a fair and adequate consideration between parties who deal at arm's length, every presumption is in favor of the validity of the transaction, and the burden is upon him who challenges the competency of the grantor to prove the invalidity of the instrument by a preponderance of the evidence. One may be weak-mined or easily influenced, but these conditions alone are insufficient to warrant the canceling of a deed for incompetency or undue influence. If the consideration for the conveyance is adequate, and the transaction is fair and equitable, and the grantor has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the deal, the purpose and effect thereof, and the power to exercise her own free will with relation thereto, the validity of the deed should be upheld. 9 Cal. Jur. 224, § 103; Carleton v. Bonham, 60 Cal. App. 725, 739, 214 P. 503.


Merralls v. Slawski (1933) 130 Cal.App. 678, 681-683.