There are certain other rules that must be kept in mind in passing on the sufficiency of the evidence. The burden of proof to show lack of testamentary capacity is, of course, on the contestant. It is well settled that a testator has sufficient mental capacity to execute a will if he has sufficient capacity to understand the nature of his act, the extent and character of his property, and the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty. Estate of Purcell, 164 Cal. 300, 128 P. 932; Estate of Arnold, 16 Cal.2d 573, 107 P.2d 25; Estate of Sexton, 199 Cal. 759, 251 P. 778; Estate of Grant, 8 Cal.App.2d 232, 47 P.2d 508; Estate of Garvey, 38 Cal.App.2d 449, 101 P.2d 551. It is also well settled that the opinion of a witness or of an expert that the testator was of unsound mind is of no greater value than the reasons given in support of the opinion. If the reasons given by such witnesses do not support the conclusion of lack of testamentary capacity, the opinion is entitled to no weight in either the trial or appellate courts. Estate of Nolan, 25 Cal.App.2d 738, 78 P.2d 456; Estate of Flint, 179 Cal. 552, 177 P. 451; In re Redfield's Estate, 116 Cal. 637, 48 P. 794; Estate of Finkler, 3 Cal.2d 584, 46 P.2d 149; Estate of Bemmerly, 110 Cal.App. 550, 294 P. 33; Estate of Dolbeer, 149 Cal. 227, 86 P. 695, 9 Ann.Cas. 795.
In re Pessagno's Estate (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 390, 393-394.
Showing posts with label capacity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label capacity. Show all posts
Monday, October 15, 2007
Thursday, October 4, 2007
Evidence of Incapacity Before and After
If the evidence shows incapacity before and after a date, there is an inference and "perhaps there is even a legal presumption" that the incapacity existed on the in-between date:
The evidence above recited is more than adequate to sustain the finding that decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time the purported holographic will was executed. As stated In Re Estate of Fosselman, 48 Cal.2d 179, 185-186, 308 P.2d 336, 340: 'Testamentary incompetency on a given day, * * * may be proved by evidence of incompetency at times prior to and after the day in question. In re Estate of Perkins, supra, 195 Cal. 699, at page 703, 235 P. 45; In re Estate of Lingenfelter, supra, 38 Cal.2d at page 580, 241 P.2d 990; see Vitale v. Vitale, 147 Cal.App.2d 665, 669-670, 305 P.2d 690. Once it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and that it is caused by a mental disorder of a general and continuous nature, the inference is reasonable, see In re Estate of Baker, 176 Cal. 430, 437-438, 168 P. 881; Vitale v. Vitale, supra, perhaps there is even a legal presumption (Code Civ.Proc., § 1963, subd. 32; see In re Estate of Schwartz, 67 Cal.App.2d 512, 521, 522, 155 P.2d 76; Byrne v. Fulkerson, 254 Mo. 97, 123, 162 S.W. 171; Bever v. Spangler, 93 Iowa 576, 601, 61 N.W. 1072, that the incompetency continues to exist.'
In re Wolf's Estate,(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 144, 148. While the inference is not conclusive evidence of incapacity, it is substantial evidence:
There was direct and circumstantial evidence that decedent's mental condition had not materially changed in the interval between the execution of the purported holographic will and the appointment, less than a month later, of proponent as guardian of the person of decedent. Such an adjudication would not conclusively establish lack of testamentary capacity (In re Estate of Jamison, supra, 41 Cal.2d 1, 13, 256 P.2d 984; see In re Estate of Worrall, 53 Cal.App.2d 243, 247-248, 127 P.2d 593), but it would constitute substantial evidence on which a finding of testamentary incapacity may rest. Cf. In re Estate of Krause, 71 Cal.App.2d 719, 725, 163 P.2d 505.
Id., at p. 149.
The evidence above recited is more than adequate to sustain the finding that decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time the purported holographic will was executed. As stated In Re Estate of Fosselman, 48 Cal.2d 179, 185-186, 308 P.2d 336, 340: 'Testamentary incompetency on a given day, * * * may be proved by evidence of incompetency at times prior to and after the day in question. In re Estate of Perkins, supra, 195 Cal. 699, at page 703, 235 P. 45; In re Estate of Lingenfelter, supra, 38 Cal.2d at page 580, 241 P.2d 990; see Vitale v. Vitale, 147 Cal.App.2d 665, 669-670, 305 P.2d 690. Once it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and that it is caused by a mental disorder of a general and continuous nature, the inference is reasonable, see In re Estate of Baker, 176 Cal. 430, 437-438, 168 P. 881; Vitale v. Vitale, supra, perhaps there is even a legal presumption (Code Civ.Proc., § 1963, subd. 32; see In re Estate of Schwartz, 67 Cal.App.2d 512, 521, 522, 155 P.2d 76; Byrne v. Fulkerson, 254 Mo. 97, 123, 162 S.W. 171; Bever v. Spangler, 93 Iowa 576, 601, 61 N.W. 1072, that the incompetency continues to exist.'
In re Wolf's Estate,(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 144, 148. While the inference is not conclusive evidence of incapacity, it is substantial evidence:
There was direct and circumstantial evidence that decedent's mental condition had not materially changed in the interval between the execution of the purported holographic will and the appointment, less than a month later, of proponent as guardian of the person of decedent. Such an adjudication would not conclusively establish lack of testamentary capacity (In re Estate of Jamison, supra, 41 Cal.2d 1, 13, 256 P.2d 984; see In re Estate of Worrall, 53 Cal.App.2d 243, 247-248, 127 P.2d 593), but it would constitute substantial evidence on which a finding of testamentary incapacity may rest. Cf. In re Estate of Krause, 71 Cal.App.2d 719, 725, 163 P.2d 505.
Id., at p. 149.
Evidence of Subsequent Capacity
Can evidence of the decedent’s capacity after the time of making the will be admitted to prove capacity at the time of making the will?
In (In re Bright’s Estate) Willard v. Bright (Sp. Ct. Mt. 1931) 89 Mont. 394; 300 P. 229, the court found that such evidence was "clearly admissible".
In April 1928, the decedent made out a will. In November 1928, she suffered a broken hip. At that time, Frances Goozee attended to the decedent until her death in February 1929. Certain putative heirs of the decedent were unhappy with the will and argued that the decedent was incompetent at the time she executed the will in April 1928.
The proponents of the will countered with Ms. Goozee, who testified that during the final four months of her life, the decedent was competent.
The trial court found the decedent competent and the contestants appealed, in part arguing that the evidence from Ms. Goozee was inadmissible because it was after the fact. The Supreme Court for Montana found the evidence was "clearly admissible":
"The evidence was offered in rebuttal of numerous declarations made by witnesses in support of contestants' allegation, denied by contestants, that for 2 ½ years or more, prior to her death, Mrs. Bright was ‘mentally unable to understand or transact her ordinary business affairs,’ and in that condition was unduly influenced by these contestees, and further numerous statements that during all of that period she was mentally incompetent to make a will. The testimony was clearly admissible." Id., at p. 397.
Point of application: If the nature of incompetency was an alleged degenerative condition, then proof that the decedent was competent after the time in question would be inconsistent with the alleged degenerative condition. Therefore, the evidence would be admissible. Are there circumstances in which the (alleged) incompetency could be ameliorated? Would the subsequent evidence be admissible in those cases? And, if so, to what purpose?
In (In re Bright’s Estate) Willard v. Bright (Sp. Ct. Mt. 1931) 89 Mont. 394; 300 P. 229, the court found that such evidence was "clearly admissible".
In April 1928, the decedent made out a will. In November 1928, she suffered a broken hip. At that time, Frances Goozee attended to the decedent until her death in February 1929. Certain putative heirs of the decedent were unhappy with the will and argued that the decedent was incompetent at the time she executed the will in April 1928.
The proponents of the will countered with Ms. Goozee, who testified that during the final four months of her life, the decedent was competent.
The trial court found the decedent competent and the contestants appealed, in part arguing that the evidence from Ms. Goozee was inadmissible because it was after the fact. The Supreme Court for Montana found the evidence was "clearly admissible":
"The evidence was offered in rebuttal of numerous declarations made by witnesses in support of contestants' allegation, denied by contestants, that for 2 ½ years or more, prior to her death, Mrs. Bright was ‘mentally unable to understand or transact her ordinary business affairs,’ and in that condition was unduly influenced by these contestees, and further numerous statements that during all of that period she was mentally incompetent to make a will. The testimony was clearly admissible." Id., at p. 397.
Point of application: If the nature of incompetency was an alleged degenerative condition, then proof that the decedent was competent after the time in question would be inconsistent with the alleged degenerative condition. Therefore, the evidence would be admissible. Are there circumstances in which the (alleged) incompetency could be ameliorated? Would the subsequent evidence be admissible in those cases? And, if so, to what purpose?
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